The paper proposes an exchange rate regime for oil-exporting countries. The goal is to achieve the best of both flexible and fixed exchange rates. The arrangement is designed to deliver monetary policy that counteracts rather than exacerbates the effects of swings in the oil market, while yet offering the day-to-day transparency and predictability of a currency peg. The proposal is to peg the national currency to a basket, but a basket that includes not only the currencies of major trading partners (in particular, the dollar and the euro), but also the export commodity (oil). The plan is called Currency-plus-Commodity Basket (CCB). The paper begins by fleshing out the need for an innovative arrangement that allows accommodation to trade shocks. The analysis provides evidence from six Gulf countries that periods when their currencies were "undervalued", in the sense that the actual foreign exchange value lay below what it would have been under the CCB proposal, were periods of overheating as reflected in high inflation and of external imbalance as reflected in high balance of payments surpluses. Conversely, periods when the currencies were "overvalued," in the sense that their foreign exchange value lay above what it would have been under CCB, featured unusually low inflation and low balance of payments. These results are suggestive of the implication that the economy would have been more stable under CCB. The last section of the paper offers a practical blueprint for detailed implementation of the proposal.
Introduction
It has long been observed that global prices for oil are considerably more volatile than prices of manufactured goods or services. But the oil price swings in recent years have been so large that oil-exporting countries have experienced variability in their terms of trade that is even higher than usual. The period 2001-2016 saw two complete cycles: a long rise in oil prices that peaked in mid-2008, followed by a short abrupt fall in the global recession of 2008-09, and then a renewed boom in 2010-13, followed by a new crash in oil prices beginning in mid-2014. For many oil exporters these swings have wreaked havoc with their financial situation, the state of their real economy, and their government's budget planning. 1 The subject of this paper is the choice of exchange rate arrangements for an oil-exporting country that wishes to reduce its future vulnerability to fluctuations in the world price of oil. The issues are surveyed briefly. But the intended contribution of the paper is to offer a very specific practical proposal, intended particularly for countries like Saudi Arabia that have traditionally pegged tightly to the dollar or countries like Kuwait that have pegged to a basket of major currencies. Those pegs have worked well in terms of offering transparency and stability. But the rigidity of the peg prevents accommodation to the biggest sort of shock that these countries face, changes in the price of oil.
In extreme cases, countries like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have recently found that their official exchange rate peg is not sustainable and have been forced to undergo economically painful and politically humiliating devaluations. A depreciation is what would have happened anyway, if the currency had been floating all along. But typically the devaluation comes after they have spent much of their reserves, suffered an adverse shift in the composition of their balance sheets, and lost credibility for official policy pronouncements regarding long-term monetary arrangements. 2 The proposal, in brief, is to add to a basket of major currencies, say the dollar and euro, a third unit, namely oil. The plan is called Currency plus Commodity Basket, abbreviated CCB. It is intended to offer the best of both worlds: the stability, transparency and predictability of a peg, on the one hand, with the sustainability and economic flexibility afforded by a floating exchange rate on the other hand. The author has in the past offered proposals for related monetary regimes that were similarly designed to provide automatic accommodation to terms of trade shocks faced by commodity exporters. But the new CCB proposal is a more practical and improved version, designed for these oil exporting countries in particular. The paper includes a detailed blueprint for how the plan would be put into action and subsequently maintained.
Exchange Rate Arrangements in Use by Oil-exporting Countries
It is not surprising that the general question whether countries should fix their exchange rates or float their currency should depend on the circumstances of the individual country in question. But it is perhaps surprising that economists do not have an agreed "conventional wisdom" as to what is the recommended exchange rate arrangement appropriate for a country that is heavily dependent on exports of a single volatile commodity like oil. Does a dependence on oil exports point to fixing, other things equal? Floating? An intermediate regime such as a target zone? Some other monetary arrangement altogether?
There are two textbook recommendations that in this context point in opposite directions. The first is that a relatively small open developing economy is a good candidate for a fixed exchange rate. "Small and open" means that internationally traded goods constitute a high share of its economy, so that exchange rate volatility is costly, if it can be avoided. "Developing" may imply that its financial markets are not as well-developed 3 and perhaps that its central bank does not have as high credibility as the monetary authorities in advanced economies, and therefore needs a visible anchor for monetary policy such as a fixed exchange rate. 4 Indeed most very small very open economies do have firm currency pegs. Examples among oil exporters include Brunei, Timor l'Este, and Trinidad and Tobago.
The second recommendation is that a country that tends to experience high exogenous volatility in its terms of trade, which certainly characterizes oil exporters, should let its currency float. The reasoning is that the under this regime the currency will automatically appreciate when the world oil market is booming and automatically depreciate when the oil market declines. Empirical evidence that the currencies of commodity-exporting countries that float do in fact fluctuate together with the global prices of the commodities in question is offered by Cashin, Céspedes, and Sahay (2004) , Chen and Rogoff (2003) , Frankel (2007) , and Habib and Kalamova (2007) , among others. (Examples of such commodity currencies include those of Australia, Canada, Chile, New Zealand, Russia and South Africa.) Furthermore, a number of studies have confirmed empirically that in the presence of large terms of trade shocks, economic performance tends to be better in countries with floating exchange rates than in countries with conventionally fixed exchange rates: Broda (2004) , Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2005) , Rafiq (2011) , and Céspedes and Velasco (2012) .
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The Gulf countries have opted for fixed exchange rates, either a peg to the dollar, as in the case of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, or a peg to a currency basket as in the case of Kuwait. The pegs have probably served the countries well in the past, especially in the 1980s and 1990s when oil prices were not quite so volatile. But it has created problems when the world price of oil exhibits big swings, up or down, as it has repeatedly since the turn of the century.
During oil booms, such as 2006-08 or 2011-13, some Gulf countries have experienced unwanted monetary inflows, credit expansion, inflation and asset bubbles. During oil busts, such as 2014-15, they experience worrisome balance of payments deficits and economic contraction. These problems would have been moderated if the currency had been allowed to appreciate during the boom and depreciate during the bust. During the boom, a strongly valued currency would have dampened monetary inflows, credit expansion, wasteful spending, overheating, inflation, debt, and asset prices. During the downturn, currency depreciation would have moderated the balance of payments deficit and losses of output and employment. It would also have automatically incentivized the private sector to diversify into other traded goods and services, thereby reducing long-term dependence on the oil sector.
Other oil exporting countries have recently suffered much worse versions of the problem than have the Gulf countries which have the advantage of higher foreign exchange reserves and lower populations. Many have been forced to abandon their exchange rate targets, not as a calm deliberate policy decision, but under the pressure of crisis. Examples include Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, among others. (Some like Nigeria continued in 2016 to cling to their exchange rate pegs despite adverse economic consequences.) When the devaluation finally comes, it is typically after the country has lost a lot of credibility, not to mention foreign exchange reserves, compared to what would have happened if it had got there sooner by floating. Currency mismatches hurt balance sheets --dollar debt is now much more expensive to service in terms of domestic --and can lead to defaults and a severe contraction in economic activity.
An exchange rate target is not the only nominal anchor or monetary regime that prevents accommodation to terms of trade shocks. The money supply and the inflation rate are two other nominal anchors in wide use, accompanied by a floating rate. If the money supply is the central bank's target, which was the monetarist idea adopted as official policy by the most important central banks in the 1980s and which continues to be the official nominal anchor of central banks in some developing countries, then there is little room to respond to a decline in the export price with an adjusted monetary setting that is easy enough to allow depreciation of the currency. If some version of the CPI is the central bank's target, which is the inflation targeting idea that became widespread among developing countries after the currency crises of the late 1990s, then again there is no room for accommodation of terms of trade shocks.
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What is wanted is a new monetary arrangement that combines some of the advantages of floating, namely automatic accommodation to terms of trade shocks, with some of the advantages of an exchange rate target, namely an explicit nominal anchor for monetary policy to allow transparency and credibility.
Unorthodox Proposals for Countries with Volatile Commodity Export Prices
In past research, the author has made some attempts to develop possible monetary arrangements that would combine accommodation to trade shocks with a firm nominal anchor.
I started by investigating the idea that countries that specialize in the production of a particular commodity should peg the value of their currency to the price of that commodity. I called the proposal PEP, for "Peg the Export Price." For example, oil producers could peg to oil.
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The proposed regime did have both of the desired properties: the pure commodity peg would supply a clear verifiable nominal anchor for monetary policy, as a currency peg does, and yet the exchange rate would automatically accommodate fluctuations in the world price of oil, as a floating exchange rate does. The main problem was that the latter property was excessive. The exchange rate would be too volatile if it rose or fell by 50% every year that the price of oil rose or fell by 50%. This proposal was offered as an alternative way of implementing 6 In the face of an adverse shift in the terms of trade, a target for the CPI, or even a target for core CPI, would not allow an accommodating depreciation, because that would raise the domestic-currency price of imports, and thereby exacerbate the change in the terms of trade. This assumes a narrow definition of targeting inflation, as opposed to the malleable notion of "Flexible Inflation Targeting." 7 Frankel (2002; 2003b, c; 2011e) and Frankel and Saiki (2002) . 8 Frankel (2005) . 9 Frankel (2011a, b; 2011b) . the popular arrangement of Inflation Targeting, which many central banks claim to follow, particularly developing countries that abandoned exchange rate targets after the currency crises of the 1990s. Drawbacks here have to do with the technical availability of the price data. The GDP deflator, for example, is typically available only with a lag, and is subject to subsequent revisions that are sometimes large. Also the proposal struck many as strange and unfamiliar.
Targeting Nominal GDP is a more familiar candidate for monetary authorities to consider, with support from many macroeconomists. It is designed to insulate countries from the full effects of terms of trade shocks, as is PEP, but also from the full effects of supply shocks such as weather disasters or productivity shocks. Even though Nominal GDP targeting has been discussed in the context of industrialized economies, I have argued that the proposal is particularly relevant to developing countries, because they are more exposed to such shocks. Statistical estimates of the relevant parameters (e.g., the magnitude of oil price fluctuations) for the case of Kazakhstan seemed to support the mathematical condition necessary for Nominal GDP targeting to dominate Inflation Targeting. 
The Proposal for a Currencies-Plus-Commodity Basket (CCB)
For countries in the Gulf, the most relevant alternative is not Inflation Targeting, but rather an exchange rate peg. The status quo is a simple peg to the dollar in the cases of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the smallest Gulf countries. The Saudi and other national authorities continue to believe that a simple dollar peg has served their countries well. Supporting research includes Al-Hamidy and Banafe (2013) and Alkhareif and Qualls (2016) .
The status quo is a peg to a basket of major currencies in the case of Kuwait. As Marzovilla and Mele (2010) describe the decision, "In May 2007, Kuwait unilaterally abandoned the dollar peg, adopted in 2003 as a first step towards the monetary integration of GCC countries, to return to the previous basket peg system. The decision was motivated by the need to limit the inflationary pressures…" The Kuwaiti authorities have kept the weights secret, but Marzovilla and Mele estimate the implicit weights on major currencies econometrically. They find greater weight on the dollar than the euro, for example .8 vs. .2 during the period August 5, 2008 to February 28, 2010. 11 Habib and Stráský (2008) , Abed, Nuri Erbas, Guerami (2003) and Aleisa, Hammoudeh, and Yuan (2008) , find generally that a basket peg would suit Gulf countries better than a simple dollar peg.
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Under the plan proposed by this paper, oil exporting countries peg their currencies to a basket that includes the export commodity --oil --alongside major currencies. In the simplest case, 10 Frankel (2014) . 11 The high weight assigned to the dollar, well beyond the US share of Kuwait's trade, may be an attempt to accommodate the importance of oil. If so, it is a very limited means of achieving this end. Even though oil sales are usually denominated, invoiced and settled in dollars, the dollar price of oil tends to fall quickly in response to an appreciation of the dollar. (The 2014-16 appreciation of the dollar was one reason that the dollar price of oil fell sharply during this period.) 12 If plans to form a common monetary union among the GCC countries were to go ahead, that would of course require a single decision for all members regarding exchange rate arrangements vis-à-vis the rest of the world, whether it is a dollar peg, basket peg, float, or something else (Merza and Cader, 2009) . GCC currency union plans appear to be in deep freeze for now. So this paper will treat the regime choices of Gulf countries as independent of each other. (Studies of the proposed GCC monetary union include Buiter, 2008; Hebous, 2006; Laabas and Limam, 2002; and Rutledge, 2008.) But if the plans were revived, the CCB proposal would apply as strongly to the group as a whole as to the individual members. Indeed, it would apply more strongly: the optimum currency area theory teaches us that the need for some flexibility in the external exchange rate rises, as the economic size of the geographical entity grows. There might also be political support for a move away from the dollar. the basket could assign equal weights of importance to three components: 1/3 to the dollar, 1/3 to the euro, and 1/3 to oil. The paper will spell out the plan in detail, to provide a sort of practical blueprint or cookbook ready to be implemented by any country's monetary authorities who might be interested in considering it.
Design details to be considered in Section 6 of the paper include:
 the choice of major currencies to go into the formula;  the oil price index to be used;  the computation of the coefficients on the major currencies and oil;  the frequency with which the coefficients would be revised;  whether the announcement of the new regime would include an immediate discrete devaluation (or revaluation) to correct an existing misalignment on the one hand, or would maintain continuity with the current exchange rate on the other hand;  whether a trend would be included in the formula, to allow the regime to be consistent with inflation targeting; and  The mechanics of setting, announcing, and implementing the daily value of the exchange rate implied by the formula. A useful counterfactual exercise might investigate the effects that the Currencies-Plus-Oil Basket arrangement would have had in a sample of countries if it had been in place in recent years in place of the actual exchange rate regime. For some countries, such as Algeria, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, the exchange rate has eventually been adjusted up or down in the aftermath of a big change in the price of oil (and also, in the case of Kazakhstan, in the aftermath of the devaluation of a major neighbor currency); but the adjustment has in some cases been long-delayed and accompanied by damaging losses of foreign exchange reserves, confidence and credibility for the authorities, and adverse balance sheet effects for domestic debtors. In the case of the Gulf countries, their foreign exchange reserve levels and overall economic strength have been sufficient to easily avoid a forced abandonment of currency pegs.
Either way, it is straightforward to look at the path that the exchange rate would have followed under the Currencies-plus-Commodity Basket alternative and to check how historical periods of large overvaluation or undervaluation relative to that benchmark correspond to evidence of imbalances externally (large balance of payments deficits or surpluses) or internally (overheating of the economy, showing up as rising inflation, or the reverse). This is the task of the next section of the paper, followed then by the detailed blueprint.
The Currency-plus-Commodity Basket and Gulf Countries' Recent History
The argument in favor of pegging the exchange rate to a basket that includes the price of oil, again, is that it would make monetary policy automatically countercyclical rather than procyclical. A simple peg to the dollar or other major currencies can exacerbate the boombust cycle. When global oil markets and hence the domestic economy are booming, the peg leads to trade surplus, balance of payments surplus, rapid reserve growth, excessive growth in money and credit, excess demand for domestic output and labor, overheating of the economy, inflation, and asset bubbles. When global oil markets and hence the domestic economy are in a downturn, the peg leads to trade deficit, balance of payments deficits, reserve loss, contraction in money and credit, excess supply of domestic output and labor, recession, disinflation, and asset market declines.
To fully explore the claim that the adoption of the CCB proposal would moderate these fluctuations would require a model of the national macroeconomy. Even restricting the set to theories of the small open economy, many sophisticated models exist with varying assumptions and varying implications. For example, some models assume that international financial markets work efficiently to finance current account deficits with net capital inflows and offset current account surpluses with net capital outflows, so that governments need not be concerned with these measures of external balance, while other models assume that capital flows are as likely to exacerbate current account imbalances as to counteract them. 13 Similarly, some models assume that the real exchange rate is the same regardless whether the nominal exchange rate is fixed or floating, 14 while others assume that movements in the nominal exchange rate often cause movements in the real exchange rate. This paper attempts a less ambitious empirical exercise. We focus on Gulf countries. For any given country, it is easy to show what the path of the exchange rate would have been since the year 2000 if the Currency-plus-Commodity Basket had been the regime in effect, and to see how it compares with the actual exchange rate policy that was followed. We will label as "undervalued" any periods when the actual foreign exchange value of the national currency lay substantially below the value it would have had under the CCB proposal, and label as "overvalued" any periods when the actual foreign exchange value of the national currency lay substantially above the value it would have had under the CCB proposal. We define "substantially" as a gap that exceeds a particular threshold, here taken to be 5%.
We will then look at some indicators of internal balance and external balance with which national authorities are concerned or should be concerned.
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Our primary indicator of internal balance is the inflation rate, though others of interest could include the GDP growth rate, employment growth, credit growth, housing prices, and equity prices. Our primary indicator of external balance is the overall balance of payments as measured by the change in international reserves, though others of interest could include the current account balance and the level of foreign exchange reserves. Our hypothesis is that during periods of "undervaluation," the countries will, on average, show evidence of high reserve inflows and experience symptoms of overheating such as high inflation; during periods of "overvaluation," they should show low reserve inflows and evidence of slack in the economy, such as low inflation.
An advantage of this approach is that it is not dependent on any particular macroeconomic model. A disadvantage is that there is no way of allowing for the many other influences on internal and external balance, such as changes in government spending, domestic political disturbances, immigration, natural disasters, and other shocks in the global economic and financial environment. Figures 1 show the actual exchange rate and the alternative CCB exchange rate for six Gulf countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar. As throughout this paper, for expositional ease we choose to show the foreign exchange value of the currency, rather than its inverse (the exchange rate defined as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency). Thus an upward movement in the graph is an appreciation. Furthermore, in these graphs we use the SDR as the neutral numeraire for valuing the national currencies. (To use the dollar as the numeraire would give a misleading picture, for countries that trade more with Europe, Asia, and the rest of the world than they do with the United States.)
Identifying periods of overvaluation or undervaluation by means of the CCB
The story is mostly similar for each of the six. The actual value of their currencies fluctuated only modestly, as a consequence of their pegging policies. The counterfactual value of the Currency-plus-Commodities basket moved more and, this paper would argue, moved in the desirable direction in each case. If the hypothesis is correct that the movement in the CCB resembles something like an equilibrium path, then the situation is worse than the observation that the riyal's peg to the dollar did not allow any accommodation of the fluctuations in the global oil market. The riyal actually tended, if any thing, to move the wrong direction. When the dollar appreciates sharply, as in 2008-09 and 2014-15, the riyal appreciates with it (against the SDR) --which is the opposite of the direction that one wants the Saudi currency to move at a time when the dollar price of oil is falling sharply. This is probably the sort of logic that persuaded Kuwait to abandon the simple dollar peg and return to a basket peg.
(ii) The Kuwaiti dinar, by means of its currency basket, indeed avoids over-dependence on the dollar (Figure 1b) . It stays rather steady in terms of the SDR. Most importantly, it avoids the sharp depreciation of dollar-peg currencies in 2008 and their sharp appreciation in 2015. If the exchange rate does not move to accommodate fluctuations in the world oil market, at least it does not move in the wrong direction.
(iii) The currencies of the other Gulf countries --Bahrain, the UAE, Oman, and Qatar (Figure 1c ) --behave very much like the Saudi currency. This is no coincidence, of course, since they are all pegged to the dollar. Again, they do not move to accommodate changes in the terms of trade and, if anything, tend to move the wrong direction (in terms of the SDR).
Consequences of overvaluation or undervaluation
To pronounce the Gulf currencies undervalued or overvalued at any point in time, because their foreign exchange values lie below or above the CCB line, is not especially compelling until we see evidence of economic consequences. The next step is to see if these countries experiences symptoms of excess demand for goods or rapid reserve accumulation during the periods when their currencies were undervalued by our criterion, and symptoms of excess supply of goods or reserve loss during the periods when their currencies were overvalued by our criterion.
For a symptom of excess demand, we focus on the inflation rate. For a symptom of international payments imbalance we focus on the change in foreign exchange reserves. Table 1 reports for Saudi Arabia measures of internal balance and external balance: inflation and change in reserves (as a percent of GDP), respectively, for each of two periods of undervaluation and three periods of overvaluation. Under-and overvaluation in this case are defined as a gap between the actual riyal exchange rate and the CCB rate (the two lines shown in the first set of graphs, Figure 1a ) in excess of 5 per cent in absolute value.
Saudi Arabia
The results are as was hypothesized. Inflation is substantially higher during the two periods of undervaluation, averaging 4.7%, than during the three periods of overvaluation, when it averaged only 1.4%. For example, inflation was virtually zero during the years 2001-04, when oil prices were low but a high dollar dictated a high riyal.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia ran large balance of payments surpluses, as reflected in additions to international reserves during each of the two periods of undervaluation, which were the peaks in oil prices centered on 2007-08 and 2010-13. The Kingdom ran balance of payments deficits, as reflected in reserve losses, during the two periods when overvaluation resulted from abrupt declines in the price of oil (2008-09 and 2014-15) without corresponding declines in the riyal. It ran a small surplus during the overvaluation period . Averaging over the three overvaluation periods, and computed as a share of GDP, the balance of payments was greater than zero, but was smaller than the undervaluation periods, which is the main point. Table 2 reports the measures of internal balance and external balance for Kuwait. Again, the results are as hypothesized: inflation during the two periods of undervaluation averaged 4.3% compared to 2.2% during the three periods of overvaluation. Meanwhile, the results also hold up regarding external balance. Kuwait ran large balance of payments surpluses on average during the periods of undervaluation, larger than during the three overvaluation periods.
Kuwait

Smaller Gulf economies
Tables 3 report the measures of internal balance and external balance for the three smaller Gulf economies: Bahrain, Oman and Qatar. (The UAE is omitted due to incomplete data.) Again, the results are mostly as hypothesized. For Bahrain, inflation during the periods of undervaluation averaged 2.4% compared to 1.5% during the periods of overvaluation [ Table  3a ]. The balance of payments surplus is also larger. Oman's inflation during the undervaluation periods averages 3.5% compared to a mere 0.7% during the periods of overvaluation and the balance of payments surplus is larger as well [ Table 3b ].
Qatar shows the one data point that goes the wrong way: its inflation rate averaged a lower level during its undervaluation periods, 2.8%, compared to 5.3% during its overvaluation period [ Table 3c ]. This was a consequence of its success at sharply bringing down inflation after 2008 (even when oil prices were high), from the elevated inflation levels experienced during the preceding years. But Qatar like the other countries does show a higher balance of payments surplus during the undervaluation years than during the overvaluation years.
Corroborating evidence from IMF article IV reports
Besides the raw data on inflation and reserves, an alternative source of information for evaluating disequilibria in these episodes is the annual Article IV reports from the International Monetary Fund. A table in the appendix presents a selection of quotes from the reports on the relevant countries in the relevant years. (A still longer table giving a more extensive set of excerpts from the IMF reports, and including the three smaller Gulf countries as well, is available in an unpublished appendix.) It is important to note that most of the Article IV consultations do not recommend that any of these countries in question change their exchange rate regimes. Usually they support the views of the national authorities that the existing currency pegs provide useful monetary anchors. (Only in 2009, in the context of a Saudi Arabia consultation, did some IMF directors encourage the authorities in all GCC countries to consider a more flexible exchange rate regime.) For the period 2001-04, during which the foreign exchange value of these countries' currencies lay well below the CCB level, the IMF comments repeatedly on the low level of inflation in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
For 2007 and the first half of 2008, when high oil prices pushed the CCB well above the countries' actual exchange rates, the Article IV reports show concern about accelerating inflation, particularly in the housing market. There are references to strong demand for goods and labor and high asset prices (equities and real estate). The Saudi balance of payments surplus piled up reserves, to a level equal to 19 months' worth of imports. Efforts to sterilize the inflow were not sufficient to "contain the expansion in monetary aggregates." This presumably contributed to Saudi inflation which "poses the main challenge for the authorities." The UAE was described as "vulnerable in the wake of an unprecedented credit and asset price boom." The years 2011 to mid-2014 constitute the most prolonged period of currency undervaluation, judged by the CCB criterion. Sure enough, the IMF documents regarding all three countries starting in 2011 are once again full of concerns about rising inflation. They also note large external surpluses in Saudi Arabia and the UAE (reaching the vicinity of 10% of GDP). They note concerns about a high equity market in Saudi Arabia and attendant risks of a correction. An economic recovery in the UAE was welcome, but by 2014 the "risk of potentially large private credit growth" called for a macroprudential policy response. In Dubai from May 2013 to May 2014, real estate prices evidently rose 27 percent and the DFM stock index by 100 percent.
With the plunge in global oil prices and rise in the dollar after mid-2014, the situation reversed yet again. The IMF reports deteriorating external balances in all three countries in 2015 and 2016. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority's reserves fell substantially, while in the UAE "the external position is moderately weaker than the level consistent with mediumterm fundamentals" as illustrated by a sharp decline in the current account. Real GDP growth and inflation fell in Saudi Arabia. The UAE saw a tightening of monetary conditions and a return of decline in the real estate market. "Price-to-rent ratios have declined since mid-2014 in both metropolitan areas [Dubai and Abu Dhabi] ." Persistently lower oil prices "weighed on the outlook…including on asset prices."
None of the foregoing information regarding the cycles over the last 16 years is surprising. But it is instructive that the more impressionistic language from the IMF confirms the evidence from the unadorned numbers on inflation and reserves: During periods when the currency was undervalued according to the CCB criterion, the disequilibrium shows up with signs of money inflows and overheating of the real economy and asset markets, and vice versa during periods when the currency was overvalued. Figure 2 summarizes in one graph for these Gulf countries the average relationship between inflation and currency overvaluation as judged by the CCB criterion. The slope of the regression line is negative: inflation tends to fall when the currency appreciates relative to the basket that includes oil along with the dollar and euro, and to rise when the currency appreciates relative to the basket. The negative slope of the regression line is statistically significant at the 10% level. (Qatar in 2003-05 and 2009-14 is an outlier.) Figure 3 summarizes in one graph for the Gulf countries the relationship between reserve changes and the overvaluation as judged by the CCB criterion. The relationship is again negative: The balance of payments tends to fall when the currency appreciates relative to the basket, and to rise when the currency depreciates relative to the basket. The negative slope of the regression line is now statistically significant at the 5 % level.
Overview of the statistical evidence for GCC countries
These statistical tests are rudimentary, to say nothing of a fully worked out theoretical model. Future research could expand the number of countries included in the data set. It could also expand the indicators of internal balance to include rates of growth of credit, GDP, and employment and financial market indicators such as housing prices, equity prices, and prices of derivatives that capture speculative pressure. It is encouraging, however, that even such simple tests support the hypothesis that when an exchange rate is not able to accommodate fluctuations in the global oil market, the country suffers larger disequilibria as measured by inflation and the balance of payments.
Design Details: A CCB Blueprint
It is one thing for an academic scholar to declare the virtues of a hypothetical system that has never been tried. Policy-makers invariably encounter a more complicated reality. Details of institutional design in seven areas are addressed here, in the hopes that they might aid implementation of the proposal. They work towards the construction of Table 4 , a concrete example of how the CCB formula could be computed and presented.
The choice of basket currencies
The first question is what major currencies are to go into the basket. Beyond the dollar, the currencies of others of the most important trading partners are the obvious candidates. When Kazakhstan had an official basket peg , for example, the constituent currencies included not only the dollar and euro, but also the Russian ruble.
Among governments that declare that the official policy is to follow a basket of currencies, it is common to keep secret the weights on those currencies and even which currencies are on the list. Often in such cases, the actual exchange rate policy --the de facto regime as opposed to de jure --is at best a very loose link to the basket. This can be verified by analyzing the exchange rate history econometrically.
Chile in the 1990s is one example of a commodity-exporting country that faithfully followed a transparent basket peg with components and coefficients that were publically announced.
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The components and coefficients of the formula must be publically announced and implemented and explained in a readily accessible way on the central bank's website if the goals of credibility and transparency are to be achieved. This does not preclude periodic revisions in the coefficients or other parameters of the formula, so long as each change is clearly announced and implemented. Chile changed its parameters once a year on average, during the 1980s and 1990s (including not just basket weights but also, initially, a rate of crawl and the width of a band).
Economists have tried various approaches to modeling the optimal currencies for a basket peg and the optimal weights to be placed on them. Major foreign currencies are often allotted basket weights related to their shares of global output or their shares in the home country's bilateral trade. The dollar often receives disproportionate weight in practice, due to its importance in international financial markets and in the invoicing of oil and other commodities. Governments in practice may also have political goals, wishing to signal or encourage stronger or weaker ties with the United States, the European Union, or other major countries.
The simulations of the CCB exchange rate in this paper include just two currencies in the basket, the dollar and the euro, and assign equal importance to the two, which has the advantage of simplicity and which may be reasonable for countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
The oil price index to be used
The oil price measure that enters the formula should be an index that is determined on liquid world markets daily, easily observed, and exogenous to the domestic economy. Subject to those constraints, it is also desirable that the type of oil that it measures be highly correlated with the type of oil produced by the country in question. The two most important indices are Brent and WTI (West Texas Intermediate). We have chosen to use Brent in this paper. An index like Dubai/Oman is presumably more highly correlated with the output of Gulf countries, but is less exogenous and reflects markets that may be less flexible, transparent and liquid.
The computation and presentation of the coefficients on the major currencies and oil
Further research could attempt to estimate weights on the various major currencies and on the oil price index, according to some criterion. One approach would be to estimate the relative weights according to what maximizes the fit in a regression of a measure of excess demand against undervaluation of the currency (e.g., during the period 2001-16) as implied by the difference between the actual exchange rate and the basket. If the measure of excess demand were the inflation rate, the resulting equation could be viewed as a way to implement inflation targeting.
In this paper's illustrative exercises, we apply the same weight to oil as to the dollar and the euro: 1/3, 1/3, 1/3. Again, this choice has the advantage of simplicity.
One must distinguish between (i) the importance to be assigned to each of the various components (when the euro or oil rises 1% in price, the dollar price of the local currency rises in price by 1/3 of one percent; this is the economically relevant question); and (ii) the absolute coefficient to be assigned to a unit of the component (how many euros and how many barrels of oil are to define one unit of the domestic currency? This way of framing the question is probably the most intuitive for presenting the novel regime to the public).
Whatever the weights, it is suggested that in actual implementation the central bank should use an easily understood formula that expresses each day's currency value as a linear function of the values of that day's dollar, euro and barrel of oil. For full transparency and verifiability, the central bank would publish on its website the formula's coefficients, and show how they have been computed from the weights. For example, assume that on the day when the weights are calculated, the dollar and euro are of equal value and that the price of oil is $50 a barrel. Then the weights of 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 on that day translate into relative coefficients of 1 dollar plus 1 euro plus 1/50 th of a barrel of oil. The public can be encouraged to envision a literal basket that contains one dollar bill, one euro note, and one-fiftieth of a barrel of oil.
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If the yen were to be added to basket, a ¼ share in importance would translate into about 25 yen (because the recent exchange rate has been about 100 yen to the dollar).
The frequency with which the coefficients would be revised
The coefficients could and should be revised occasionally, but in a transparent way. Ideally this would happen once a year, say on January 1. [Normally they would be adjusted in such a way that, whatever the new relative weights of the currency plus commodity components, there would be no jump in the absolute value of the currency on that day.]
There are two reasons why the coefficients in the formula might be adjusted. The purely technical reason is that, even if there is no desire to change weights that capture the relative importance of the components (say, still 1/3, 1/3, 1/3) the dollar/euro exchange rate and the dollar price of oil are likely to have evolved over the year. If, for example, the price of oil has risen from $50 a barrel to $60 a barrel, then the coefficient that has been used in the formula now translates into a weight that is 20% higher than the desired 1/3. The coefficients need to be adjusted correspondingly, to return the weights back to their desired levels. (There is an analogy with periodic rebalancing of an investment portfolio to keep desired weights.) Secondly, the authorities may wish to adjust the weights themselves. If one trading partner or another, or oil itself, has grown or fallen in importance to the national economy, or if the authorities decide that they want to encourage movement in that direction, then they can adjust the weights and hence the formulas. There need no loss of credibility or consistency, if they remain within the same CCB framework.
6.5 Would the announcement of the new regime include an immediate discrete devaluation to correct an existing overvaluation (or revaluation to correct an existing undervaluation) on the one hand, or maintain continuity with the current exchange rate on the other hand? If a country is eventually going to leave a simple dollar peg for a more flexible exchange rate arrangement, it is best to do so in "good times", rather than waiting until the currency comes under severe downward pressure so that the change in regime takes the form of a large devaluation under circumstances of lost reserves, mismatched balance sheets, lost credibility.
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Often, however, it is not until a time of crisis that changes in monetary regime are seriously contemplated. Examples are oil-exporters who resisted depreciation of their currencies when oil prices fell in 2014-15, clinging to their exchange rate targets until faced with crisis circumstances (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Algeria, and Venezuela). When reserves run short, devaluation is usually unavoidable.
The Currencies-Plus-Commodity Basket proposal can still be implemented together with a devaluation (or revaluation upward). Mechanically in Table 4 , in place of row 4 (which shows the current exchange rate at the time of CCB implementation, a new row 4d can be inserted showing the desired new exchange rate, e.g., a 10% fall (or increase) in the dollar value of the domestic currency. The absolute coefficients on each basket component in row 5 are then computed as the relative coefficient weight from row 3 multiplied by the new exchange rate in row 4d.
A country that has been repeatedly forced by economic developments to abandon declared exchange rate targets, and thus needs to salvage some credibility after a new devaluation, might be able to make a virtue out of necessity. Kazakhstan's devaluation of the tinge on August 20, 2015, for example, followed earlier regime abandonments that had been forced by declines in the price of oil and in the foreign exchange value of the Russian ruble. The Kazakh authorities could have announced a CCB regime at the time of the 2015 devaluation and explained that they were now formalizing the determinants that had been driving the exchange rate all along. They could even have chosen parameters (weights on the dollar, euro, ruble and oil, plus a possible rate of crawl) so that the CCB formula roughly fit some segment of past history of the actual exchange rate. If the actual exchange is judged to have been in equilibrium at various points in the past, even if the equilibria were arrived at only late and painfully, choosing the coefficients to fit the past history might be better than an arbitrary choice like 1/3-1/3-1/3.
6.6 Should a trend be included in the formula, to allow the regime to be consistent with inflation targeting in the longer term? Exchange rate crawls were especially popular in the 1980s and 1990s, when inflation rates were quite high in most developing countries and the authorities wanted to offset what would otherwise be a steady loss of price competitiveness on international markets. It has not been uncommon to combine a rate of crawl in the exchange rate together with a basket.
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Even today, it might make sense to add a trend parameter to the formula, the value of which could be adjusted periodically just like the coefficients. The trend allows the CCB system to be consistent with inflation targeting. If the inflation target in the coming year is the same as the expected inflation rate among major trading partners, say 2% a year, then the trend can be set equal to zero. But a country may want to set a higher trend. If, for example, its inertial inflation rate has been recently running 8 per cent a year and it wants to gradually bring it down to 2%, it could add to the formula a trend of 6% in the first year, 5% in the second, and so forth until in the seventh year the trend is set to zero. Or it may choose even in the long run to allow a positive trend if there is believed to be a need for steady-state real appreciation due, for example, to rapid productivity growth and the Balassa Samuelson effect.
In the illustration represented by Table 4 , we set the trend equal to zero. Implicitly this means targeting an inflation rate that is the same as the foreign inflation rate.
6.7
The mechanics of setting, announcing, and implementing the daily value of the exchange rate implied by the formula Table 4 illustrates what might appear on a central bank's website. Row (1) states that the formula will assign equal importance to each of the three components: weights are 1/3, 1/3 and 1/3. Next we take December 31 as the notional date at which the CCB regime would be benchmarked and would have gone into effect. So row (2) reports the dollar value of the major currencies (1.0 for the dollar itself, a little higher for the euro) and the dollar price of oil on that date. Row (3) reports the relative coefficient that each of the three weights translates into, given those prices.
To complete the formula, the authorities need to decide whether they wish to devalue (or revalue) as part of the transition, in which case the plan cannot be publically announced ahead of time but rather needs to be unveiled at the same time that it is implemented. In this illustration, we assume that no devaluation is needed, and that the formula makes sure that the new exchange rate on the day that the program is launched is the same as the old exchange rate. Rows (4) and (5) show how to make this calculation, using Kuwait's December 2016 exchange rate for the sake of concreteness. The resulting CCB formula, which will set the exchange rate on a daily basis for the coming year, is given in this example by:
(Exchange rate $/dinar) t = 1.0918 + 1.0382 (Exchange rate $/€) t + 0.0192 (Price of oil in
This formula would feature prominently in the central bank's press releases and be posted on its website, with a link explaining the details of the calculation. To help give the general public an intuitive understanding of the new policy, it could be made tangible by means of a picture of a literal basket physically containing 1 US dollar bill and 9 US cents, 1 euro coin and 4 euro cents, and a container of oil holding the equivalent of .019 barrels.
Once a day, perhaps at noon GMT, the formula's blanks are filled in for that day: the euro exchange rate and Brent price of oil (both observed, say, in London). The formula then yields a number for the resulting dollar/dinar exchange rate, to which the monetary authorities commit for the subsequent 24 hours. In other words, the central bank stands ready to buy and sell dinars in exchange for foreign exchange at that price. A variant could be to proclaim a band around the price, perhaps a band of plus or minus 1%.
The hypothetical example illustrated for the case of Kuwait in rows (4)- (7) shows what would have happened if the new CCB regime had been implemented on December 31, 2016. We assume no need for realignment on that day, so the exchange rate begins at $3.2755 per dinar. What would the formula dictate for the exchange rate on March 1? The euro appreciated by more than 3 per cent during January-February (from $1.052 to 1.088). The price of oil fell, but only by about 2% (from $ 56.82 a barrel to $55.72). As a result, the CCB formula would have produced an exchange rate on March 1 of $ 3.292, about 0.5 percent stronger than it was at the end of 2016.
The authorities should be prepared with enough reserves to intervene heavily, if necessary, to keep the market rate at the announced rate. Intervention could continue to be carried out in dollars or whatever mix of international currency the authorities are already comfortable with. But if the initial level is not overvalued or undervalued, there is no reason why heavy intervention should in fact be needed. Indeed, after a few days, it is likely that banks and other foreign exchange traders would become sufficiently familiar with the system that they would not challenge the rate. 
